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This report serves three purposes: to record my observations and impressions from being in 
Tokyo before and after the March 11 earthquake; to summarize trips to Kobe and across Honshu 
to the Japan Sea coastal area; and to provide some thoughts as further information became 
available during April.  
 
Japan now faces its worst crisis since World War II. The earthquake quickly became a triple 
disaster. The immense tsunami generated by the earthquake hit the Iwate, Miyagi, and 
Fukushima prefecture coastlines with great devastation and loss of more than 22,000 lives. The 
tsunami also crippled the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, creating potential radiation 
threats and global repercussions for energy policy.  
 
Many of the effects of the triple disaster are long-lasting, and the flow of new, important 
information requires a continual revision of our understanding. This is particularly true regarding 
the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant and electricity shortages, as well as development of energy 





I caution that this report is based on impressions at the time - that is, when news coverage was 
focused on human-interest and nuclear-scare, and there were not enough facts to make detailed 
analyses. I had no special access to information on what was happening in the affected areas. I 
focus on life in Tokyo. Accordingly, I do not have much to add about the ongoing recovery and 
reconstruction efforts in Tohoku. My observations range from very general to quite specific.  
 
Especially during the first few days, information was partial. Like everyone, I relied on the 
media, in my case television (NHK - which had good coverage in English - CNN, BBC), the 
local English language newspapers (Yomiuri, Japan Times), and the Financial Times and 
International Herald Tribune. I was outraged to learn when, in speaking on the phone during the 
week with my wife and children in the US, how sensationalist, ignorant, incorrect, and out of 
context much of the US TV coverage was. While CNN in Japan was earlier and quicker to cover 
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the Fukushima Dai-ichi story as it first developed, even in Japan it tended to be sensationalist, 
without providing a good context. 
 
This report also draws significantly on excellent discussions I had in Tokyo with company 
executives, friends, acquaintances, and even strangers, of all ages. Their information, insights, 
views and attitudes, and the flavor of their comments and anecdotes importantly shaped my 
perspectives. Virtually all my conversations that week typically began by asking if the person’s 
family and friends were OK (they were), was their home significantly damaged (no), and what 
had they done that first night (Friday) when subways and trains were not operating and the roads 
were jammed (most walked home).  
 
 
I The Earthquake 
 
The Great East Japan Earthquake (Higashi Nihon Dai Shinsai), as it is now formally called, 
measured 9.0, making it the biggest earthquake in Japan’s recorded history. The epicenter was 
off Sendai along the Sanriku coast, in the Tohoku region (northeastern Honshu).  The 1923 
earthquake that devastated Tokyo was 8.3, the 1995 Kobe quake was 6.8. The Chile earthquake 
in 1960 of 9.5 is the strongest ever recorded. 
The Richter scale for earthquakes is exponential. A 6.0 earthquake is about 33 times and a 7.0 
about 1000 times as strong as a 5.0 earthquake. The Japan Meteorological Agency also uses a 
different seismic intensity scale, from 0 to 7, which measures the shaking at a point on the 
earth’s surface, rather than at the seismic shock epicenter underground. 
 
 
1 Shaking and Swaying 
 
I was sitting at a desk in my room on the 35th floor of the New Otani Hotel Tower Building in 
Tokyo when the earthquake struck. Suddenly at 2:46 PM the building began to shake. “Oh, an 
earthquake”, I thought. But the shaking became stronger and wouldn’t stop; and I couldn’t get up 
from my chair.  And the building began to sway strongly. It was very scary. Once it stopped, I 
went to the window to see if any buildings had collapsed, or if there were any fires. But it all 
looked the same. I was safe, the building was safe, and people were safe. And that was 
essentially true for everyone in Tokyo. Japan’s strict building codes from several decades ago 
ensured that essentially no buildings collapsed; Tokyo’s many buildings swayed dramatically, 
but withstood the shocks.  
 
A major aftershock (7.5) occurred about 30 minutes later, and we were told to evacuate the 
building. Going down the stairs was surprisingly easy, as I did not feel any need to rush. After a 
half-hour on the street in front of the hotel, and then several hours in the lobby, because the 
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elevators were still not in operation, I obtained another room on a low floor, easy to walk up to. 
It was only after I was in my room that Friday evening that I saw TV, which repeatedly showed 
scenes of tsunami devastation - only a few different ones, continuously repeated - alternating 
with reports and scenes of Tokyo streets jammed with people walking because the subways and 
trains were not working. The morning after the quake, the elevators were operating, so I returned 
to my 35th floor room. 
 
Thus began a fascinating 10 days. There was widespread anxiety. As it turned out, there was no 
real danger in Tokyo, although over the next 10 days life was a bit inconvenient. Like most of 
the world, I was riveted by the heart-rending, continuously updated reports of death and 
destruction. With entire villages turned to rubble, some 450,000 people were made homeless.  
 
But what makes this crisis qualitatively different is the partial meltdown at four of the six nuclear 
reactors at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant. Fukushima Dai-
ichi now joins Chernobyl, Kyshtym, Windscale, and Three Mile Island as one of the five most-
significant nuclear accidents, as measured by the International Atomic Energy Agency, an 
intergovernmental agency for scientific co-operation.  
 
 
2 Life Goes On 
 
I was in Tokyo for the 25th anniversary conference of the Columbia Business School’s Center on 
Japanese Economy and Business (CJEB), titled “Japan, US, China in the World Economy”,  to 
be held on March 16. But of course it was postponed. Virtually every event in Tokyo – 
conferences, seminars, university and school graduation ceremonies – was cancelled. 
Wonderfully, all of my many scheduled meetings the week of March 14th with Center corporate 
sponsors, other professionals, recent university graduates, and other friends were possible; 
indeed a few were added for the Saturday, Sunday, and even Monday holiday morning, March 
21st.  
 
Since the Hotel Okura Tokyo was where the conference was to have been, from March 14 I was 
comfortably ensconced there. I stayed one night beyond my initial registration, but had to move 
to the main building from the south wing “to save electricity”. The hotel was virtually devoid of 
guests. 
 
3 First Impressions 
 
My most immediate, compelling, and enduring impression was of the great strength of the 
Japanese people and Japanese society in abnormal circumstances. I have long known this 
strength, and more or less take it for granted. However, it has particularly shined through in this 
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period of adversities and difficulties. People in Tohoku, even in the most severely hit areas, have 
been calm, orderly, brave, resolute, even stoic. They have been helpful to others, pragmatic, 
flexible, honest, prepared to endure, and determined to prevail.  
 
As one friend noted, people even lined up in orderly queues to buy toilet paper to hoard. I know 
of no significant instances of looting or other criminal activities in those early, chaotic days in 
the afflicted Tohoku areas. The phrases gambatte (endure) and sho ga nai (it can’t be helped) 
were repeatedly used when I met with Japanese during the week. One Japanese friend told me he 
is more proud of the Japanese than he has been in years.  
 
 
4 The Context 
 
The area affected directly has 14.3% of Japan’s population. The seven Tohoku prefectures have 
12.7 million people and Hokkaido has 5.5 million. Tohoku GDP in 2007 was 46.7 trillion yen 
($584 billion at 80 yen/dollar), 9.0% of Japan’s total. The population of Iwate, Miyagi, and 
Fukushima prefectures is 5.7 million, and its share of GDP is 4.0%. On the order of 500,000 
people left their homes in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima (the afflicted prefectures), of whom 
several hundred thousand continued to be in emergency evacuation centers in the first weeks, as 
TV continuously reported in excruciating detail.  
 
The tales of losses, of survival, of houses, buildings, and businesses destroyed were very 
moving, indeed really difficult to watch for long. The sympathetic responses of Japanese, and 
indeed of people all over the world, have been compelling. In the face of many problems, the 
quick government efforts, as well as private initiatives to rescue people, find bodies, and handle 
evacuations were impressive.  
 
To understand the nature, efforts, and implications of the triple disaster, one has to place them in 
appropriate contexts. The earthquake not only was unprecedentedly strong for Japan, it created a 
huge tsunami, which happens mainly when earthquakes are offshore. Perhaps the earthquake 
alone was less devastating than the 1995 Kobe earthquake, but the combined damage with the 
tsunami resulted in far greater loss in lives and property (real capital, in economist’s jargon).  
 
In Japan I did not see comparisons with the Great Kanto earthquake of 1923, but that certainly 
was far worse. Fire raged two days and nights. Some 143,000 people died, much of Tokyo and 
Yokohama were destroyed, and the way reconstruction was funded eventually led to Japan’s 
financial crisis of 1927.  
 
If not fire, water. Major tsunamis have hit the Sanriku coast of Tohoku several times since 1896 - 
notably in 1933, 1960 (from the Chile earthquake), and now. The 1896 tsunami killed 20,000 
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and a wave topped 120 feet in one village. Over the past two decades or so, high walls and sluice 
gates were built along the coast to defend against tsunamis, but they were not big enough to 
handle the tsunami of March 11.  
 
The devastations are regional. While Kanto (Tokyo and surrounding area) and Tohoku have been 
affected by electricity shortages and anxieties about the spreading of radioactive materials, this is 
not at all the situation in Kansai (Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto) or other parts of western Japan.  
 
As I stress throughout this report, what makes this disaster qualitatively different is the damage 
to nuclear reactors at the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Dai-ichi plant. 
On the day of the earthquake, once the Fukushima Dai-ichi damage was recognized, Japan’s 
National Industry Safety Agency ordered the evacuation of people within a 10 kilometer radius, 
and the next afternoon, ordered the evacuation of everyone within 20 km, and those beyond 20 
km but within 30 km to remain indoors if they did not leave. There were about 68,000 people 
living within the 20 km radius, and another 92,000 in the 20-30 km zone, for a total of 160,000 
within 30 km.  
 
 
5 Tokyo Following the Earthquake 
 
The biggest problem for me - for everyone in Tokyo - in the days immediately following the 
earthquake was the lack of information. Just how threatened were we, staying in the city?  
 
For the first six to ten hours or so, cell phones and regular phones were out, and trains and 
subways were shut down. People wanted to know whether their family and friends were safe, 
and their homes OK. Fortunately there was a weekend to recuperate and adjust. On Monday 
March 14, people reported to work in an overcast, somber Tokyo as everyone voluntarily 
conserved electricity.  
 
An unprecedented 262 significant aftershocks were recorded in the first week. We felt numerous 
aftershocks every day, but neither I nor anyone seemed to worry much about them. It was easy to 
get around Tokyo – taxis were abundant, subways and trains were working again, and traffic was 
light because gasoline supplies were short. 
 
As the week after the earthquake progressed, our greatest concern was the possibility of 
dangerous radioactive air spreading to Tokyo, though in fact the actual recorded levels were very 
low. Ultimately, like most Japanese in Tokyo, I came to be (and am) persuaded that even in the 
highly unlikely worst-case scenario (which I thought to be complete meltdown or explosion), 
Tokyo’s air will not become dangerous. Nevertheless, until TEPCO brings the Fukushima Dai-
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ichi nuclear reactor problem under control, the psychological costs to Tokyo residents will 
probably be substantial, if latent.  
 
I found rather remarkable the return to a sort of normality to Tokyo life when the work week 
began Monday March 14. On reflection that should not be surprising, given the way Japanese 
behave in their very structured, orderly, diligent society, but it was a subtle surprise to me. Still, 
the atmospherics of Tokyo were far different from the normal, pre-earthquake time and from 
what I experienced later in Kobe and western Japan.  
 
It felt a bit grim; it was too early to enjoy life again. Grey weather combined with voluntary, 
cautionary, sharply reduced lighting in railroad stations, other public places, stores, and buildings 
to save electricity gave the sense both of difficult times and resoluteness and determination. 
 
People had to deal with less-frequent and more-erratic commuter train service. Everyone 
recognized the need to conserve electricity, reinforced by plans TEPCO announced from the 
beginning of the week to schedule rolling blackouts in different parts of Tokyo and the Kanto 
area more-widely. I gathered electricity would not be curtailed within the central wards of 
Tokyo. One reason given by the government was to sustain manufacturing and other business 
activities. But they surely did not want to interrupt electricity service to foreign embassies (as 
mentioned to me by several Japanese) or to their own government political and administrative 
offices. And that made sense.  
 
The media reported how convenience stores almost immediately sold out of instant noodles and 
staple foods that did not require refrigeration. Other practical daily necessities such as disposable 
diapers and small batteries also quickly disappeared from store shelves. Such shortages were 
temporary, as stocks could be readily resupplied. Friends in Nagoya and Kobe later told me of 
mailing batteries and diapers to their families in Tokyo. Port facilities and roads southwest from 
Tokyo were not damaged, so transport to Tokyo was not a problem.  
 
Shortages of gasoline in Tokyo deepened as the week progressed, leading to long lines of cars 
waiting at stations. By the second weekend (March 19 – 20) many (probably most) gas stations 
were sold out and closed. One friend said the senior bureaucrats (and no doubt company 
officials) with assigned cars and drivers do not use them much during the day, so perhaps many 
of those queuing at gasoline stations were the drivers of these cars. Early in the week, one senior 
government official stated that Tokyo’s gas inventory was all in cars, not in gas stations.  
 
A retired major international oil company executive, a Japanese friend for many years, told me 
gasoline supply is not a fundamental problem. The government has 120 million barrels of oil 
reserves which can be released. Most refineries are not in the afflicted area. Japanese refineries 
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have a long-run operating capacity of 92%, since they must close periodically for routine 
maintenance. In Okinawa there is a very large refinery that was running at about 80%.  
 
Another friend told me that after the earthquake the government immediately, quietly, and 
informally requisitioned the inventories of major gasoline suppliers in order to support the Self-
Defense Forces, the police, firefighters, rescue teams, and other units dispatched to the afflicted 
areas. Gasoline delivery trucks were rerouted to Tohoku to deliver these essential supplies. I 
don’t think there was much opportunistic pricing during the week or two it took for supplies to 
return to normal. 
 
Throughout the week there were long lines of taxis everywhere, waiting for customers. When I 
asked a taxi driver, he said he and his company have no fuel problems, only a lack of customers. 
I remembered only later that most taxis run on propane.  
 
As more and more information became available, people’s personal and business concerns 
evolved. Early in the first week, colleagues at several companies with offices in Sendai told me, 
to my surprise, that staff there were all safe, their offices were open and in operation, and the 
large buildings they were in had electricity. Since the TV I was seeing showed only the tsunami 
damage of Sendai’s low-lying coastal areas, I did not realize that damage to the central business 
district (which is several kilometers inland), and much of the rest of the city, was small. 
Similarly, Fukushima City and most other inland cities and towns were not seriously damaged. 
The main devastation was in towns and villages right on the coast. 
 
The two ongoing threats to one’s sense of personal safety in Tokyo were further severe 
earthquakes and, more importantly, the possibility of radioactive fallout from Fukushima Dai-
ichi.  
 
A couple of days after the earthquake, the Japan Meteorological Agency reported a 70% 
probability of a major aftershock (earthquake) within the next three or four days, and a 50% 






There continues to be extensive media coverage of the Fukushima Dai-ichi power station. There 
are 14 nuclear power reactors in Tohoku near the earthquake epicenter. Besides the 6 at 
Fukushima Dai-ichi, there are 4 at Fukushima Dai-ni, 3 at Onagawa northeast of Sendai 
(operated by Tohoku Electric Power Company), and Japan Atomic Power Company’s Tokai 
Dai-ni near Mito. Of these, 3 at Fukushima Dai-ichi were already shut down for routine 
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maintenance. The 11 in operation, including those at Fukushima Dai-ichi, automatically shut 
down when the earthquake occurred. It is the 4 tsunami-damaged units at Fukushima Dai-ichi 
that were and continue to be the huge problem. 
 
Actual levels of radioactivity in the air once it appeared in Tokyo were very low, as TV and the 
media carefully and thoroughly discussed, analyzed, and explored. Media coverage of the 
evolving conditions in the different reactors was also detailed and thorough. The government 
steadily provided a great deal of factual information, and academic and other specialists appeared 
on TV and in other media to analyze the available evidence about the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
situation. Neither the government nor the Japanese media were willing publicly to discuss worst-
case scenarios, probably on the reasonable grounds that would only increase anxiety, even panic.  
 
Of course analysis of the worst-case scenarios was what I wanted in deciding whether to 
continue to stay in Tokyo. Fortunately, I benefitted from discussions with several American and 
Japanese Tokyo resident friends who were carefully analyzing information and studies from 
various sources, including an MIT science website, I learned by Wednesday (March 16) they had 
concluded that even if the Fukushima reactors were to melt down or explode (assumed to be the 
worst-case scenarios), dangerous radiation levels would not spread to Tokyo. Their analyses 
were strongly empirical.  
 
This reaffirmed my sense that I was safe in Tokyo. And that seemed to have been the widespread 
sense of Japanese in Tokyo, though apparently not of some other foreigners. I was pleased later 
to learn from the September 22 presentation by Professor David Brennan, Higgins Professor of 
Radiation Biophysics, College of Physicians & Surgeons of Columbia University, at the CJEB 
March 22 symposium at Columbia, “The Economic, Health, and Political Consequences of 
Japan's Earthquake,” that Tokyo was and is indeed safe.  
 
There were other radiation issues causing anxiety. Milk, leafy vegetables, and other agricultural 
products produced in parts of Fukushima contained excessive levels of radioactive particles 
which had fallen onto crops and grass eaten by the cows. The distribution and sale of affected 
products was immediately halted, thereby bringing this localized situation rather quickly under 
control. This was another case of excessive, media-hyped fear, not only in Japan but abroad. 
  
Behaving in seeming panic and without adequate information, the US, Korea, China, and other 
Asian economies halted food imports from Japan. Japan is a large net importer of food, but does 
export very small amounts of high quality, very fresh, vegetables, fruits, and fish, as well as 
brand-name rice. My intuition is that Japanese safety standards had been initially set to defend (I 
won’t say “protect”) Japanese from even slightly radioactive imported foodstuffs. Nonetheless, 
the government’s assurances that Fukushima vegetables were safe for adults to eat not 
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surprisingly were met with skepticism by some Tokyo residents. Of course, farmers elsewhere in 
Japan grow lots of vegetables, so I do not think this is or will be a serious problem for Tokyo.  
 
On Wednesday, March 23, the radioactivity issue developed a new, temporarily dangerous 
dimension when the Tokyo government announced that because radioactive Iodine 131 had been 
detected in the city water supply, infants less than 1 year old should not drink tap water. Not 
surprisingly, families with small children - and surely others as well - immediately rushed out to 
buy bottled water. The water samples measured a level of 210 becquerels of Iodine 131. The 
recommended upper limit for adults is 300. The radiation had been carried by air from 
Fukushima, was caught by rainfall, and thereby entered the water supply. Iodine-131 has a half 
life of just eight days, so the threat fairly quickly came to an end. A day or two later the 
government reported the water was safe again.  
 
The government’s reports came within hours of when the water was first sampled. But people 
became concerned about how soon they would be informed of further dangers. It certainly 
seemed rational for families with small children, and probably adults as well, to stockpile 
bottled. It will be interesting to see how long such hoarding persists. 
 
 
7 Disrupted Plans 
 
The canceling of many events in Tokyo following the earthquake initially was in part because of 
possible travel difficulties for attendees. More recently, some international events were cancelled 
because of foreigner fears, albeit misguided, of radiation dangers. Initially, many celebratory 
events were cancelled not only in Tokyo but in other parts of Japan as expressions of sympathy 
and concern. This was not a time to party, or to be seen partying. Young friends told me their 
graduation ceremonies at the University of Tokyo and Keio University in late March had been 
cancelled, and I am sure that was the case throughout Kanto.  
 
Nonetheless, as widely reported in the news, one elementary and junior high school in an 
afflicted area in Tohoku determinedly held its graduation ceremonies to show their students (and 
families) that life goes on and that Japanese will prevail. Many new school year openings in 
April were delayed. One businessman, whose son’s senior year at Keio University has been 
delayed for a month, suggested to me that all universities should delay opening until September, 
because of electricity shortages and other disruptions, but fundamentally in order to change their 






8 Some Vignettes 
 
An estimated 20,000 or so foreigners living in Japan quickly left the country, including 1500 or 
so Chinese working in Tohoku. I found it somewhat surprising that some foreigners left Tokyo, 
but perhaps not unreasonable, especially those with nervous families. Some temporarily went to 
Osaka, Kyoto, or further west. It happened to be a school vacation period, just before schools 
were scheduled to begin the new school year in April, so such travel did not seem abnormal. 
 
A senior official in one large, internationally oriented Japanese company told me when we met 
on March 18 that his company had decided to pay the roundtrip plane fares home for their 
expatriate employees, and when appropriate have them come back to Tokyo. He explained that 
many of them did not know Japanese well, did not know how to deal with possible food or other 
shortages in their neighborhood stores, or with electricity blackouts, or interruptions in the train 
or subway services. So, to allay their family’s anxieties, it was better to help them leave 
temporarily. The next day I happened to speak with a young Japanese working in the same 
company, in his first year after university graduation; he said the company made it clear that all 
Japanese were expected to report to work, and not to find excuses to leave Tokyo.  
 
In chatting with the president of another very large, internationally oriented, Japanese company, I 
learned that, when the earthquake struck, he was at a meeting at his office in Tokyo on one of the 
top floors of his company’s headquarters, a building of some 40 stories or so. Once a number of 
decisions were immediately made, late in the afternoon he walked up to the top floor, went 
around all the work spaces to encourage his staff, and then did the same on each floor as he 
walked down to the ground floor. Fortunately he lived nearby, so he easily walked home. But 
then he had to climb more than 20 floors to return to his condo home, where his wife was 
waiting. Like others, he had not been able to speak with her because cell phones and land phones 
were not working. 
 
A business friend told me he walked seven hours to get home. He asked me whether I knew what 
was really selling in stores as he walked home. I had seen a newspaper article reporting that 
bicycle stores had sold out, but I assumed their inventories were not large. He said it was 
women’s sneakers. Female office workers wear pumps (with heels) to work and they wanted 
more comfortable shoes to walk home in. Later in the week I meet a young college graduate who 
had been at the office of her new employer. She said she walked home (two hours or so) in 
pumps because the lines of women to buy sneakers at stores along the way were so long it did 
not seem worthwhile waiting.  
 
Another recent college graduate told me she walked a bit and then got on a bus. On the bus was 
an elderly lady who said she had been in Tokyo during World War II as a child when it was 
bombed, and this earthquake was not nearly so frightening as that. The traffic was so jammed 
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that walking was faster than the bus, so my friend got off and walked. Fortunately, by midnight 
or so the commuter trains were running, enabling her to get home. 
 
Another friend, a Japanese businessman, told me he was so tired that when he got into a taxi after 
work at about 8 PM that he fell asleep for two hours. When he awoke, the taxi had been able to 
go only a few blocks due to the traffic jam. The driver told him he was sleeping so soundly that 
he didn’t want to wake him. Eventually the taxi was able to take him home, several hours later. 
 
My most poignant conversation in Tokyo was with a young waitress in one of the hotel’s 
restaurants. She spoke some English, learned primarily during a year in the UK four years ago. 
She was working part-time in the mornings, and attending a college night-school program in 
hotel management. She was at the hotel when the earthquake hit. Because she had to work the 
next morning, she had stayed overnight at the hotel’s facilities for its staff.  
 
Her college has a program, for those who pass an exam, to work for a year in a hotel in the US, 
the Philippines, or one of several other foreign countries. She would like to do that, but fears she 
would have difficulties finding a job in Japan on her return, so she felt it was better simply to 
look for a job in Japan after she graduates. She was from Wakabayashi, a small coastal town near 
Sendai. Before the earthquake, she had planned to return to work in Sendai, but now that seemed 
completely uncertain.  
 
She could not contact her parents until six days after the earthquake. Her parents were safe and 
remained in their house, which was not damaged. However, the tsunami destroyed half the town 
and swept away her two uncles; they remained missing. She has no brother or sister. She was 
quiet and calm, and displayed little emotion other than what I took to be stoicism.  
 
II East and West of Japan: Seemingly Different Worlds 
 
Not surprisingly my scheduled meetings the week of March 22-25 with Governor Masaaki 
Shirakawa and other senior officials of the Bank of Japan, and with Tsunehisa Katsumata, chair 
of TEPCO, were cancelled, as were several other scheduled meetings. Moreover, my planned 
trip from Tokyo on March 26 to Sendai, to see the opening game of Sendai’s Rakuten Eagles 
baseball team, and following the game to go to Kobe the next day, had been cancelled. I later 
learned that the earthquake had done modest damage to the stadium building, but mainly to the 
artificial turf, which had to be replaced. I was pleased that the Eagles were able to hold their 
opening home game in their Sendai stadium on April 27.  
 
Late Friday March 18, I decided to take a train to Kobe on March 21, a holiday, which was 
several days earlier than I had initially planned. I then proceeded as scheduled on a trip with 
friends the week of March 28 to the Japan Sea coast. I felt that I could not accomplish a great 
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deal more with a further four days in Tokyo. I did not think it was necessary to leave Japan, even 
though the American Embassy announced on March 17 that it would provide charter flights out 
of Japan for American citizens, and the US State Department urged Americans not to travel to 
Japan.  
 
While many Americans, including me, often think of Japan as running north-south, Japanese 
think of it as running east-west. Kanto (which means east of the invisible line, and includes 
Tokyo), Tohoku (which translates as northeast), and Hokkaido are east. Everything else is west.  
 
I stayed at the Hotel Okura in Kobe from March 21 to 28, having several Center-related business 
meetings, seeing a few friends, decompressing from what had been an exciting, intense stay in 
Tokyo, and beginning to prepare a preliminary draft of this report. I then took my scheduled 
combined business and pleasure trip with Japanese friends, a couple about my age, in their car to 
Tottori and Shimane Prefectures.  
 
We drove to Himeji, and then across Honshu through the mountains, spending two nights at hot-
springs hotels (onsen) before arriving in Matsue, a city of about 200,000. En route we visited 
various notable sites, including a huge silver mine with 350 kilometers of tunnels at various 
levels. It was initially established in 807, and was developed and modernized over time as rich 
new silver veins were found. Not surprisingly, it had come under the direct control of the 
Tokugawa shogunate and then the Imperial government, before being sold to the Mitsubishi 
Corporation in 1896. It ceased operations in 1973, and now is a tourist attraction in a rather 
remote area. We also visited the national top-ranked, huge and very lovely Adachi Japanese 
garden.   
 
While in Matsue we spent a fascinating morning at a private waste disposal company, meeting 
with the president and inspecting the plant, located at a nearby port, and its large kiln 
(incinerator). This visit had been arranged by a friend from the Development Bank of Japan, who 
had helped arrange the financing of the kiln’s construction a decade earlier.  
 
In the afternoon we met with the head of the research institute of the major local bank to receive 
a briefing on the Tottori and Shimane economies. We spent April 1 night in Okayama before 
returning to Kobe. On April 3 I flew to Seoul, South Korea, as scheduled. 
 
The focus and flavor of Kobe and all the other places we visited was very different from that of 
Tokyo.  Life was so normal: no shortages of anything, bright lights, fine food, and plenty of 
water. It was the end of the spring vacation period, just before the new school year begins, and 
stores and streets were bustling. The hotel was happily filled with young couples and families 
with their children. As usual on weekends, scrumptious wedding receptions were held at the 
Hotel Okura Kobe; unlike in Tokyo at the time. Despite stories of foreigners decamping from 
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Tokyo for Kansai, I saw only one foreign couple at my Kobe hotel; maybe foreigners were in 
Osaka or Kyoto.   
 
I have two main explanations of why western Japan was suddenly so different from Tokyo.  
 
First, due to a quirk of economic history, there is no shortage of electric power in western Japan.  
In western Japan electricity is 60 Hertz, the system having been established in the 1880s by 
General Electric’s provision of equipment and technology to a new company in Osaka. At about 
the same time the German firm Siemens, following European standards, built a 50 Hertz system 
for Tokyo Electric Lighting Company, TEPCO’s original name. I vaguely remembered that from 
learning Japanese economic history decades ago, but somehow did not realize these two different 
systems persist today. (Consumer products in Japan generally work on either 50 or 60 Hertz, but 
production equipment, especially motors, does not.) 
 
Japan’s nine major electric power companies (plus one in Okinawa) are highly regulated, local 
public utility monopolies. It is technologically possible to convert electricity from 50 to 60 Hertz, 
and vice versa, but it is expensive. There are only two frequency converter plants, both of modest 
size. So, like Tokyo before the earthquake, in Kobe and throughout western Japan, neon lights 
were on everywhere; and stores, train stations, and buildings were, as always, too brightly lit for 
my taste. 
 
Second, in western Japan the Tohoku triple disaster was far away, geographically and 
psychologically. Of course great sympathy was expressed for those lost or suffering in Tohoku.  
Kobe friends remembered their earthquake 16 years ago, in at least one case having lost family 
members. As elsewhere in Japan, there was an outpouring of donations to help Tohoku. And the 
increasing difficulties at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station of course received 
immense media coverage, but quite appropriately in western Japan there seemed to be little sense 
of personal danger or risk. After all vegetables, milk, and water supplies were local and safe.  
 
The main concerns I heard were about the possible danger of local nuclear power plants; one 
person in Matsue bemoaned the fact that there was a nuclear power plant only a few miles to the 
west, and the wind typically blows to the east. And several people on the Japan Sea coast 
expressed irritation that the Koreans had suddenly stopped buying their delicious, perfectly safe, 
fresh fish. 
 
No doubt the supply chain difficulties affected some manufacturers in western Japan, as well as 
elsewhere. However, on my travels there, I was not especially looking for these problems, and 
there were no obviously manifestations of them.  Life was so incredibly normal. 
 




On the whole, it was my impression that the government moved rapidly and effectively in 
dispatching the Self-Defense Forces, police, firefighters, and others to the afflicted areas to 
rescue people, evacuate people to temporary facilities, recovers bodies, and begins the huge 
removal of debris. The main highways in Tohoku were quickly restored to operation. However, 
recovery will be a slow process. And, the lack of clear-cut decisions - particularly for dealing 
with those evacuated from devastated coastal villages and from the Fukushima Dai-ichi danger 
zone - is dismaying, if perhaps not unexpected. 
 
Of course, certain economic effects were obvious.  Most immediate was the terrible losses of 
lives (human capital) and houses, buildings, and production facilities (physical capital). The 
number of confirmed dead gradually increased as bodies were found; I assume almost all those 
still listed as missing are no longer alive, so the toll will be some 22,000 dead. I have not seen a 
breakdown by age, but presume that older people are a disproportionally large share. The early 
estimates of the physical losses ranged up to ¥25 trillion, about 5% of GDP. 
 
There are macroeconomic, structural, and unexpected specific-industry effects, which reflects 
both the reliance of supply chain systems on very specific, often seemingly minor, components 
from afflicted Tohoku plants and the present and expected shortage of TEPCO electric power to 
its Tokyo and Kanto customers, especially in peak times of electricity demand during the 
summer. 
 
Most of the macroeconomic effects are straightforward. In the short run, production capacity was 
destroyed or damaged, so supply capacity has been reduced. But demand declined, not only in 
Tohoku but throughout the country, in part as people cancelled various celebrations and parties. I 
was charmed to see Tohoku sake brewers on TV urging people to drink their sake. Following 
admonitions not to entertain (or be seen entertaining), a counter-message went out urging people 
to eat out, spend, and thereby restore demand. Not surprisingly, it was expected that the 
economy’s ongoing recovery prior to the earthquake would now stall for a couple of quarters, 
until perhaps mid-fall 2011, before resuming GDP growth. In the medium run, government and 
private reconstruction expenditures in Tohoku will increase domestic investment absolutely and 
as a share of GDP, and generate somewhat more rapid growth.  
 
One key issue is whether the triple disaster will serve as a catalyst moving the economy out of its 
two decades of mediocre economic performance, widespread underemployment as well as overt 
unemployment, mild but persistent deflation, and some rather pessimistic attitudes about Japan’s 
future. It was, and still is, too early to tell. Much depends on the responses of individuals and 
companies – the Keynesian animal spirits – and the political will not only to support 




1 Electricity Shortages 
 
An immediate issue in Tokyo and elsewhere in Kanto and Tohoku was how to deal with 
electricity supply shortages because TEPCO’s electricity production initially dropped 40%. The 
next concern was how to deal with electricity shortages at peak times in the hot days of the 
coming summer. TEPCO scheduled daily rolling blackouts for most of the Kanto area (except 
central Tokyo) the first week (March 14 – 20) after the earthquake, and for most of the next 
week. However, the immediate, deep voluntary electricity conservations and efforts by railroads, 
companies, buildings, and other public areas and households, was impressively large, and made 
TEPCO’s blackout schedule even more difficult for everyone. 
 
It quickly became clear that rolling blackouts were an emergency solution only. The steady 
supply of stable electricity flows with low volatility is essential for all production facilities 
engaged in continuous operations, and important to services, especially restaurant and 
entertainment establishments as well as data banks.  
 
The owner of an ice cream plant in Kanto told me that in the first weeks after the earthquake the 
plant had to halt production and clear production pipes two hours before scheduled electricity 
supply interruptions, and it took two hours after power was restored to restart production. Break-
even was 75% of capacity, but in the first weeks the plant was able to operate at only 40%. By 
early May it was only back to 70%. 
 
My concerns while I was in Japan about electric power shortages in Tokyo and beyond were 
reinforced when I met in Korea with Korean economists and businessmen, who were concerned 
this would be a huge problem for Tokyo in summer 2011, and indeed perhaps summer 2012 as 
well. Japanese voluntary conservation efforts would strengthen further, and companies and 
households would adjust somehow, it was assumed, but would not be sufficient.  
 
It was not until late April, back at Columbia, that I learned that TEPCO owns shut-down thermal 
(oil) electric power generating facilities in Kawasaki (next to Tokyo) and elsewhere that it will 
quickly re-open. On March 25, TEPCO estimated its peak generating capacity would be about 
46.5 million kilowatts in summer 2011, much less than estimated peak demand of 55 million kw. 
However on April 17, TEPCO revised its peak generating capacity by summer to 52.0 million 
kw. The gap is now much narrower, but much depends on how cool (or hot) the summer is, and 




Government policy thus far has been based on direct guidance (controls) rather than market-
oriented price mechanisms to constrain demand and increase supply. Large firms in Kanto were 
initially asked to cut electricity consumption by 25% by the summer; this was then reduced to 
15%. Executives I spoke with said they would make their best efforts, as they did not want to 
suffer reputation loss. METI officials have suggested increasing the household price of 
electricity in excess above normal monthly patterns, but that has yet to be accepted by the 
government.  
 
Independent producers of electricity, typically for their own uses but with excess capacity, can 
sell to the grid. My understanding, without much information, is that while their costs are about 
14 yen per kilowatt hour, above the now-controlled prices, so independent producers have little 
incentive to generate and sell electricity beyond their own needs. I gather the government has not 
allowed the price to rise. In any case, the amount of such excess capacity is small relative to 
anticipated supply shortages. 
 
Electricity is essential for a modern, advanced, industrial, urban economy. Energy policy, and 
particularly nuclear energy policy, has become one of the most important issues in Japan 
following the earthquake. It will be debated in the coming months, and the answers are far from 
clear. It is directly related to the future role of nuclear generation of electricity. In some way this 
is symbolized by Fukushima Dai-ichi: how to contain the reactors and achieve cold shutdown, 
what to do over the longer run to keep the reactors cool, and what to do about the radioactively 
contaminated areas. On April 17 TEPCO announced it would take six to nine months to achieve 
cold short of its three Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors. Until then, some limited leakage of 
radioactive materials will persist, as I understand it, and it will not be safe to move back into the 
30 kilometer radius or other nearby areas where the winds blow.  
 
The 10 nuclear reactors in the afflicted Tohoku area that were safely shut down have not been re-
opened and are not likely to be in the near future. Local resident opposition makes that 
impossible. In 2007 TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant in Niigata prefectures 
was damaged by an earthquake and has now been repaired, and four of the seven reactors have 
been put back into operation. However the Niigata governor has said he would not allow the 
remaining three to re-open until they are assured to be safe.  
 
In early May Prime Minister Naoto Kan made two key nuclear energy decisions.  
 
One was a strong request (essentially a demand) that Chubu Electric Power Company close its 
Hamaoka nuclear facility in Omaezaki city, Shizuoka prefecture. The plant has long been 
considered by far Japan’s most dangerous nuclear facility, particularly to tsunami damage. It is 
120 miles southwest of Tokyo and sits on a major fault line. A government study forecasts an 
87% chance that a magnitude 8.0 or higher quake will hit the area in the next 30 years. Nearly 
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80,000 people live within a six-mile radius. Chubu agreed to a temporary shut-down of the two 
active reactors at the site, and will not restart a third that was down for routine maintenance. The 
plant provides about 10% of Chubu’s power supply. Company officials estimate it will take two 
to three years to build a 12-meter-high tsunami wall stretching nearly a mile along the coast. 
 
Second is a decision to halt construction of the planned 14 nuclear facilities. Importantly, this is 
not an abandonment of nuclear energy; Kan stated that their opening would be delayed until 
safety could be reassessed and assured in light of the Fukushima Dai-ichi experience. 
 
There are immediate, as well as longer-run issues. Will shut-down nuclear reactors be re-started? 
If so, when, and under what circumstances? The governor of Fukui prefecture (on the Japan Sea 
side on Honshu), site of 13 of the nation’s existing 54 nuclear energy reactors, has stated he will 
not allow them to be opened after routine maintenance until he is assured they are really safe.  
 
The worst-case scenario is that it will be politically impossible in the coming months to restart on 
schedule, if at all, any of the 33 reactors now shut down - 11 in the Tohoku epicenter area and 22 
for routine maintenance. They will have to meet higher and as yet undefined safety standards. In 
such a case, all of Japan, not just Tokyo and eastern Japan, will have significant electricity 
shortages this coming summer and beyond. How the trade-offs between perceived safety 
difficulties and electricity shortages will be dealt with is likely to be a major political and 
administrative problem in the immediate future as well as the longer run. 
 
However, both the central and local governments have provided significant subsidies and 
benefits to the local small coastal communities where nuclear reactor plans have been sited. The 
electric power companies pay large property taxes, and typically have become the largest 
employer. As a consequence, these sited communities flourished. Not re-opening reactors after 
routine maintenance will mean loss of jobs and other local benefits on which many of these 
communities have become dependent.  How this plays out will be an important factor in Japan’s 
future nuclear policy. 
 
 
2 Supply Chain Interruptions 
 
In the first week following the earthquake, the media reported potential supply chain 
interruptions because factories in Tohoku producing very specific components had been 
damaged and production halted. The affected factories often were the dominant or even sole 
suppliers of essential specific items and components. Even when production resumed, 
aftershocks required ongoing recalibration of precision machines.  
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Frequently the problems have been at the lower levels of production, involving parts that 
individually are relatively inexpensive, but are often made by smaller, highly specialized sole-
source producers. A large assembly company typically has several major (Tier 1) suppliers of 
large parts and components. Those companies each have several suppliers (Tier 2) of more 
specific subcomponents. However, at the next one or two levels down in the specificity of the 
production process (Tiers 3 or 4), there may be only one company producing a small item for all 
the suppliers at the next tier up. 
 
A wide range of industries have been affected. 
 
For example, the automobile and electronics industries, not only in Japan but abroad, were 
dependent on microprocessors produced by the damaged Renesas Electronics Corporation plant 
in Ibaraki Prefecture, which has a 30 percent global market share. The microprocessors are 
custom-designed for a specific car model for each of the major automobile assemblers in Japan 
and abroad, so it was not possible to substitute microprocessors from other plants or other 
suppliers. And, I was told of a 1500 yen ($19) component used in many Toyotas that is produced 
by only one damaged factory in Tohoku.  
 
b: I was told that inventories of a particular engine brush necessary as a replacement part for 
Shinkansen and other train engines were produced in one damaged plant in Hitachi, so if 
production is not resumed, train schedules would have to be reduced from late May or so.  
 
A Tokyo consultant to Japan’s food processing industry told me that a particular sealant for 
packaging food was produced in only one damaged factory. Two weeks later, just before leaving 
Japan, I read a newspaper article about a shortage of natto (fermented soybeans, a food staple) 
due to disruption of production in Tohoku. The second paragraph of the article said that natto 
production had resumed in just two days. The third paragraph said the problem was the lack of 
the sealant to package natto.  
 
It was difficult while I was in Japan to assess the broader industry or macroeconomic impacts of 
these supply chain interruptions, and it is still premature to make a good assessment.  
 
As subsequent reports came in throughout April, the responsiveness both of the afflicted 
producer companies in Tokyo and of the companies purchasing their products has been 
impressive. Toyota and other large companies sent some 2000 engineers and other technicians to 
restore production at their suppliers, and sub-suppliers. The production interruptions due to 
supply chain difficulties have been significant, but basically only short-run, at most probably 
only six months, and most within three months of initial damage. 
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These costs indicate that supply chain management based on economies of scale in production 
and just-in-time assembly with low inventories will have to be rethought. In particular the 
reliance on one geographic location for the production of any component for which close 
substitutes are not readily available may well end. Additional factories will open elsewhere, even 
at the loss of economies of scale. The key question for Japanese manufacturers is where they will 
locate these new factories – elsewhere in Japan or abroad.  
 
3 Declining Sectors 
 
Most of the Japanese directly hit by the tsunami lived in low-lying coastal villages and towns 
with local ports in the Sanriku area. They were mainly farmers, fishermen, and those who 
provided local services in their communities. And many were not young. As elsewhere in Japan, 
young adults had gone to larger cities, not only in their prefecture but farther away. This is not 
surprising; farming and fishing in Japan have not been internationally competitive for decades. 
Their participants have been able not only to survive but to have good incomes and live well due 
to Japan’s highly protective system of production. Producers are subsidized both directly by the 
government and indirectly by import restrictions, with the costs falling on taxpayers and 
consumers. The farming and fishing industries have been declining gradually by generational 
change; young new entrants continue to be far fewer than those retiring or dying. The average 
age of farmers is 65. 
 
Driving from Himeji, west of Kobe, through the mountains and villages and on to small port 
towns on the Japan Sea coast, reinforced my concerns about these adjustment issues. I thought as 
we drove: these little villages nestled in valleys, and these little fishing village ports, have no 
future. Unless they happen to have hot springs (onsen) with good tourist facilities, as a few do, 
they cannot compete in a globalized world. They are tenacious and politically powerful, but 
unless taxpayers are prepared to subsidize them forever, and the government is willing to 
continue its protectionist policies in a liberalized global economy, they will eventually disappear. 
The economy’s future, as it has been for more than four decades, lies in sophisticated, 





The responses in Japan to these triple disasters are an ongoing, rapidly changing process. This 
report is basically impressionistic; my thoughts have evolved over time starting from my first 
week in Tokyo following the earthquake. Given what I know as of early June 2011, here are 
some of my conclusions. 
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Two of my biggest concerns are the control, cooling, and containment of the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
nuclear reactors, and the specter of electricity shortages throughout Japan. 
 
Parts of Tohoku have been damaged, but not Japan as a whole.  The earthquake did localized 
damage in Tohoku, but it was not so severe. The greatest damage was inflicted on the Sanriku 
coastal areas hit by the tsunami – small villages and their ports, not the central business areas of 
any major cities. The clean-up process of debris will take time. Decisions on what and where to 
rebuild have yet to be made, and longer-run living solutions for many evacuees are still far from 
clear. 
 
The biggest direct damage was the flooding of the Fukushima Dai-ichi facility’s four nuclear 
reactors. The contaminated land and the evacuation of residents in nearby areas (up to 30-40 
kilometers away) is a major problem. Fukushima Dai-ichi is qualitatively different from the 
earthquake and tsunami disasters, and probably much worse. Its long-term effects are impossible 
to evaluate well. Low but sustained doses of radiation may affect children even more than adults 
in the areas near the reactors, but it appears there is essentially no danger elsewhere.   
 
Certainly within Japan (and elsewhere) energy policy will be rethought. The most fundamental 
energy-related issue will be what to do about nuclear power plants, both in the nearer term and in 
the long-run. One of my concerns is that it will be politically difficult to re-open reactors 
currently shut-down for routine maintenance in plants that had been presumed to be safe, and 
hence that there will be a national electricity shortage.  
 
Japan’s wariness of nuclear power will probably be long-lasting; new nuclear power plants may 
well not be built in the foreseeable future, and even best-case (from a power-supply standpoint) 
the re-opening of plants down for routine maintenance are likely to be delayed. Coal and oil give 
off emissions, including CO2, pollute the air, cause deaths, and are a factor in global warning. 
Probably Japanese electricity plants will increasingly rely on LNG. Alternative energy sources 
are very expensive.  
 
Thus, electricity shortages will be an ongoing problem at least for Tokyo, Kansai, and much of 
Tohoku since TEPCO produces about one-third of Japan’s electric power. TEPCO will increase 
electricity supplies somewhat in the near future by re-opening shut thermal plants. A key 
problem is how to supply electricity in periods of peak demand – notably early afternoon hours 
on hot summer weekdays this summer and next. In the longer run electric power companies will 
invest in building natural gas-fueled power stations, to meet demand and to replace existing 
facilities.  
 
The other direct macroeconomic effects on Japan are clear and more manageable. Growth has 
been interrupted, perhaps for six months or so, but the economy will grow more rapidly in 2012 
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and 2013 than earlier projected because of reconstruction expenditures in the affected Tohoku 
areas.  
 
The supply chain interruptions are essentially short-run, and are being overcome more rapidly 
than expected. In the longer run, both producers and assemblers may hold larger inventories. 
And, producers will probably give up some economies of scale by having smaller, more 
geographically dispersed factories, Will the dispersion be within Japan, or will companies build 
in foreign countries? The answers are not obvious: they probably depend on the importance of 
potential technological leakages to competitors. 
 
It had been hoped that a crisis would force politicians and bureaucrats - perhaps at the insistence 
of the public and the media - to cooperatively address the substantive, fundamental structural 
issues underlying Japan’s two decades of miasma. But seven weeks after the March 11 
earthquake, that does not seem to be happening. Petty politics, with very few constructive policy 
proposals, seem to continue to prevail. Political leaders, bureaucrats, the public - none see the 
earthquake and tsunami as the crisis that should shake things up and sweep in needed changes. 
But that yet may happen. 
 
